Threat Model
Security
OpenClaw's security model starts from the assumption that the model can make mistakes. The goal is to limit impact by constraining access control, execution scope and privilege boundaries before trusting the model to behave perfectly.
Run the Security Audit First
Basic / deep / fix
openclaw security audit
openclaw security audit --deep
openclaw security audit --fix Risk Priorities
1. Any open DM or open group setup combined with high-privilege tools should be fixed first.
2. Any public network exposure without strong auth or with weak tokens should be corrected immediately.
3. Browser control, remote CDP and node execution are operator-level capabilities and should never be exposed casually.
4. Lock down permissions on ~/.openclaw and only load plugins or Skills you explicitly trust.
Three Core Security Surfaces
Who can send messages
DM pairing, allowlists, group allowlists and mention rules decide who can actually trigger the system.
What the bot can do
Tool profiles, sandbox isolation, exec approvals, device pairing and browser exposure together define the action boundary.
Where state and credentials live
Session logs, provider credentials, channel tokens and allowlists all live on disk, so disk access itself is part of the trust boundary.